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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD
COMMISSION,
Appellant,
vs.
GEORGE KENDELL and IRENE H. KENDELL, his wife; EARL M. KENDELL, and
FLORA H. KENDELL, his wife; RULON
E. WILLIAMS and VIOLA R. WILLIAMS,
his wife; and UTAH SAND AND GRAVEL
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

Case No.
10834

Respondents.

SUPPLIMENTAL
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
A. Distinction Between Police Power Regulation
and Taking by Condemnation
In connection with the principle raised in
Point II, it should be pointed out that the trial
court erred in the admission of evidence pertaining to profits and loss thereof following the
erection of the wire fence which altered the
access of the business customers of defendant.

(See Tr. 9, 15, 16, 17 a_nd particularly 56 and 4S50.)
It is well established in the State of Utah
that a state has full power to adjust access from
private property to a public thoroughfare. See
Springville Banking v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, 349
P.2d 157 (1960); State v. Parker, 13 U.2d 65 (1962);
and particularly in point, Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District v. Hilsop, 12 U.2d 64, 362
P.2d 580 (1961); Utah Railroad Commission v.
Hansen, 14 U.2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963); Sine ·v.
Helland, 18 U.2d 222, 418 p.2d 979 0966).
See also an interesting annotation in 91
A.LR.2d 963. (The case of Sprinville Banking
Co. v. Burton, supra. is cited in the annotation)
In this case, the overriding principle before the court is whether or not the State of
Utah can adjust an access-way to and from private property to a public thoroughfare, even
though such adjustment results in a diminution
in the market value of said private property.
It is readily conceded that the State must
pay for a "taking" of private property for public
use, (see Article I, Section 22, Constitution of
Utah), but in such instances, the State only
must pay for the reduction in the value of the
property taken by virtue of its exercise of the
power of eminent domain. It is equally true, a.s
the cases above have uniformly pointed out,
that the State by the exercise of its police pow-

ers in the regulation use of private property,

even tho'.Jgh such regulation impairs rights in
property and significantly reduces the free exercise of the rights in said property by its
owner.
If the public interest is served thereby no
damages are recoverable. It therefore follows
that the trial judge was in error in admitting
evidence relating to the reduction of business
to defendants occ-:Jsioned by the erection of the
wire fence, adjacent to the new freeway.
If the courts allow the defendants in this
case to submit evidence regarding the reduction of business occasioned by the construction
of said fence, the effect thereof is to overrule
the Springville Banking case and all other Utah
jurisprudence.

B.

Waiver

It is strongly urged by Respondent that the
Appellant in this case is now foreclosed from
raising the error of the trial court on appeal.
At the trial court level, appellant herein submitted Instruction No. 12 (see Transcript p. 28-A).
It is conceded that the wording of said instruction does not precisely verbalize the principal
of law used by Appellant as a basis for reversal
in this case. However, the substance of the reuested instruction which was denied by the
trial judge contained the same legal precept
here contended for.
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In addition thereto, the Appellant, after
learning of the verdict and judgment rendered
thereon, filed a motion for a remitteur, and
shortly thereafter filed a motion for a new trial
alleging as a reason thereafter the same reason
that is asserted under Point II in Appellant's
Brief. Appellant certainly can be said to have
cured any asserted a.cquiescence to the admission of said prejudicial evidence by the Defendant-Respondents.
Appellant, in support of the motion for new
trial, submitted to the trial court and counsel a
trial brief (see Transcript p. 36) which delineates
the same notions which are advanced here. It
is strongly urge dthat the application of the exception to doctrine of waiver incorporated in
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 has been fully
complied with in this case when it is considered that the State stands to lose $40,000, plus
interest, from the date of judgment if this award
is allowed to stand.
It would be unreasonable and inequitable
to apply the doctrine of waiver in this case considering (1) the fact that a new trial was convened and the court had before it the theory
on which this appeal is based. In addition thereto, the unjust resnlt which would accrue in the
event the escape hatch which Rule 51, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides is not employed by this court would be unconscionable
and in direct conflict wtih the long standing
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position taken by this court in cases indistinguishable on their facts. If the theory of
the Defendant-Respondents is allowed to stand
in this case they would be able to accomplish
indirectly what this court and the overwhelming majority of respectable american jurisdictions have prohibited. A concrete fact situation
may be used for illustration; Assume: (1) Appellant placed the fence in question in the exact
place where it actually was located five years
prior to the condemnation action and subsequent highway construction. (2) A condemnation action is commenced five years following
the erection of said fence along exactly the
same route which the State actually used in
this case. It couldn't be argued that the establishment of the fence by the State wasn't a legitimate exercise of its police power in so regulating the flow of traffic. It could not be doubted
that defendants would have any legitimate
claim as against the State for damages by virtue
of such legitimate regulation. Therefore, it is
only by the fortuitous circumstance of the coincidental establishment of the fence and the taking which distinguishes this case from the long
line of well-reasoned opinions from this court
denying compensation for exactly the same
type of regulation for which defendant demands damages herein. Indeed, it would seem
that if the court allows this judgment to stand,
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it is in effect enacting a "private of special law

. . . where a general law (could) be applicable • • •
II

CONCLUSION

The record reveals clearly that a plethora of inadmissable and highly prejudicial evidence was admitted at the trial level. The conclusion is irresistible
considering the Jury's award that the inadmissablE
evidence was strongly considered in arriving at the
verdict.
Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON,
Special Assistant Attorney
General
431 South 3rd East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

